Veritic semantics for epistemic modals

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Epistemic modals have the name they do because they are often thought to describe how things stand with bodies of knowledge. My aim in this talk is to argue that this semantics is false: epistemic modals have no special semantic ties to knowledge, evidence, or any other epistemological concept.

My argument proceeds in two stages. First, I’ll raise a dilemma for any knowledge-describing semantics for epistemic modals: such a semantics either fails to explain the unembeddability of epistemic contradictions, or fails to explain the embeddability of certain sentences explicitly describing epistemic reasons.

I’ll then use this dilemma to motivate an alternative, veritic semantics for epistemic modals, according to which epistemic modals describe how things stand with the contextually relevant truths.

The result is a significant departure from the orthodox account of the epistemic flavor of modality: it is reason claims, not epistemic modals, that describe knowledge.