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## Fragmented contexts

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Stalnaker's influential conception of the conversational context as *common ground* models it in terms of the information mutually taken for granted by all interlocutors (e.g., Stalnaker 1978). But Stalnaker's account has a downside: All information in the common ground – whether it was contributed as at-issue content or non-at-issue content – is equally *available*, or *accessible*, to all participants. However, a number of seemingly unrelated phenomena motivate the thesis that all information is not equally available:

1. Questions & Answers: The same presupposed information may be available as a correct (partial or complete) answer to one question not to another, to which it is also a correct answer.
2. Presupposition accommodation in disagreements: In disagreements, speakers are often willing to temporarily accept presuppositions of their opponents. Such presuppositions are only *available* for as long as the parties jointly accept one view. Different presuppositions become *available* with the temporary joint acceptance of the other view.
3. Making information available: Under some conditions, asserting information that is already in the common ground is a felicitous move and serves a conversational purpose.

In this talk, I will argue that adding the notion of *available information* to the model can account for the above phenomena. On the model, the common ground is 'fragmented': the common ground does not form a single consistent, deductively closed set of presuppositions, but is rather organized into a number of fragments. (Cf. Stalnaker 1984, Cherniak 1986, Elga & Rayo 2014 for mental fragmentation.) Information in a single fragment is jointly available relative to a linguistic task. Linguistic tasks, in turn, are individuated by questions-under-discussion (cf. Roberts 1996).

**References:** • Cherniak, C. (1986): *Minimal Rationality*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. • Elga, A. and Rayo, A. (2016). Fragmentation and Information Access. Unpublished Ms. • Roberts, C. (1996). Information Structure in Discourse: Towards an Integrates Formal Theory of Pragmatics. In: *Working Papers in Linguistics*, 49, 91-136 • Stalnaker, R. (1978): Assertion. Reprinted in Stalnaker, R. (1999). *Context and Content*. Oxford: OUP, 78-95. • Stalnaker, R. (1984). *Inquiry*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.